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Since 2002, the ownership of Norwegian hospitals has been centralized to the state. The four 
regional health authorities are responsible for the management of the hospitals, and the actual 
performance is done by the subsidiary health trusts (or HFs). As state-owned enterprises with 
certain sector political goals, the corporate governance of the health trusts is not exactly the 
same as private enterprises which mainly pursue pure business goals. The survey which the 
thesis uses investigates the HF board members’ opinions on some issues of sector political 
goals and corporate governance. The main purpose of this thesis is to find the differences of 
the opinions among different groups of HF board members, and to study whether the 
differences are consistent with relevant theories such as motivation and management theories.  
 
The data of the thesis is based on a questionnaire of the survey program Management of 
State-owned enterprises with sector political goals. The respondents of the survey cover all 
HF board members who are the target population of my research. Several quantitative 
methods, such as descriptive statistics and non-parametric tests, are chosen to detect the HF 
board members’ opinions and the differences of their opinions on the issues of sector political 
goals and corporate governance. 
 
The analyses mainly show that, the appointed board members with macro and broad 
perspective pay more attention to sector political goals than the employee representatives with 
micro and specific perspective do. The appointed board members have more consciousness of 
responsibility, power and autonomy. The analyses also show that the appointed board 
members will be more likely to represent the sector interests, whereas the employee 
representatives prefer to represent business or public interests. Furthermore, the board 
members with public sector backgrounds pursue public interests, whereas the board members 
with private sector backgrounds prefer business interests. These findings indicate that, 
different ways of elections, different logic between politicians and medical workers, previous 
work experiences in public or private sectors and some other motivation or logic factors can 
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1.1 Background and research questions  
 
Many state-owned enterprises (or SOEs) are established around the world in order to achieve 
certain sector political goals. An important feature of state-owned enterprises is, pursuing the 
sector political goals efficiently, which the state wants to achieve. Health care is one of the 
key industries for the majority of countries, as well as an important component element of 
social security and social welfare. In the market mechanism, private health enterprises are 
able to improve efficiency and quality of health care through market competitions, but they 
are hard and even impossible to achieve some public goals of health care, such as equity, 
public health, social security and welfare. Therefore, state-owned health enterprises (refer to 
the health trusts or HFs in Norway) are established to keep the balance between "equity" and 
"efficiency" of health industry. 
 
Generally, one government motivates state-owned enterprises to pursue sector political goals, 
mainly by the instruments such as legislations, regulations, subsidies, government pricing, etc. 
as Rattsø and Sørensen (2010) mentioned in their design of the survey program. However, 
these instruments are usually not sufficient to maintain the state-owned enterprises pursuing 
the single sector political goals without the supervision and control from governments. The 
fact is that the state-owned enterprises also have business goals as a consequence of 
insufficient funds. The aim of these business goals is to make ends meet and to achieve 
self-profit of the enterprises. Following the standpoint of the enterprises their own, pursing 
business goals are preferred and more beneficial than pursuing sector political goals. 
Therefore, the government needs to supervise and control the strategic decision making and 
operation of state-owned enterprises through corporate governance. An important aim of 
corporate governance is to ensure the state-owned enterprises pursuing sector political goals, 
if insufficiency of common management instruments. 
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Establishing boards of directors is an approach of corporate governance for supervising 
state-owned enterprises (Dong, 2008). Since governments are not able to supervise and 
control state-owned enterprises at every moment, they can accomplish this purpose through 
SOE boards. The main function of SOE boards is making macro-strategic decisions of the 
enterprises, as well as playing a role like a bridge to link the superior authorities and the 
state-owned enterprises. In that sense, the SOE board members’ cognition on issues of sector 
political goals and corporate governance may directly influence the goal settings of 
state-owned enterprises.  
 
However, due to the different personal features of the board members of Norwegian health 
trusts (or the HF board members), such as the differences of professional backgrounds, 
academic backgrounds, ways of elections and superiors, their cognition on issues of sector 
political goals and corporate governance are supposed to be different. Hence, it is quite 
significant to explore the HF board members’ opinions and the influencing factors of their 
opinions on issues of sector political goals and corporate governance, in order to motivate the 
health trusts to pursue sector political goals. 
 
This thesis will explore the two following issues: Firstly, how do the board members of 
Norwegian health trusts consider the issues about sector political goals and corporate 
governance? Secondly, how do some personal features of the HF board members influence 
their opinions on the issues of sector political goals and corporate governance? The specific 
research questions will be: 
 
(1) What are the HF board members’ opinions on various questions related to sector political 
goals and corporate governance? 
(2) What are the differences of opinions on the related questions between appointed board 
members and employee representatives? What do the differences indicate? 
(3) What are the differences of opinions on the related questions between board members with 
professional backgrounds in public sectors and in private sectors? What do the differences 
indicate? 
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1.2 An introduction to the survey program 
 
The idea of this thesis comes from a survey program "Styring av statlige selskaper med 
sektorpolitiske mål" by Jørn Rattsø (NTNU) and Rune J. Sørensen (BI). Professor Terje P. 
Hagen (UiO) led me to participate in the program as an internship. The data of this thesis is 
based on one of the two questionnaires of the survey program. Below is a brief description of 
the survey program.  
 
Table 1. Description of the survey program 
 
Theme Management of State-owned enterprises with sector political goals 
Authors Jørn Rattsø (NTNU) and Rune J. Sørensen (BI) 
Contents Two questionnaires  
Target respondents Board members and directors of state-owned enterprises in Norway  
Valid samples of 
the health trusts 
164 (recycle rate 0.39) 
 
 
1.3 What are Norwegian health trusts? 
 
In Norway, the state-owned enterprises in health care industry usually refer to so called health 
trusts or HFs. A brief definition of state-owned enterprises is to those enterprises created and 
owned by a government to undertake commercial activities on behalf of an owner government 
are “organized as separate legal entities distinct from the government with the freedom to 
dispose of their own capital and income” (Ludvigsen, 2010, p. 17) .The Merriam-Webster 
dictionary defines a trust as “a combination of firms or corporations formed by a legal 
agreement; especially: one that reduces or threatens to reduce competition.”  
 
The Norwegian health trusts or HFs are health enterprises owned by the four regional health 
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authorities (or RHFs). Most of the health trusts are public hospital trusts and some are 
pharmaceutical trusts or others. 
 
Unlike the U.S. health care system which is based on market mechanisms, the Norwegian 
health care is a national welfare. All citizens are insured by the National Insurance Scheme in 
Norway. This is a universal, tax-funded, single-payer health system (Tanner, 2008, p.18). “In 
2002 the responsibility for the Norwegian hospitals was transferred from the elected 
county-level governments to central state government. The ownership was thereby centralized 
to a single body – the state” (Stigen, 2010, p.23). 
 
The Web site of Ministry of Health and Care Services provides the information that the 
Ministry “has supervisory responsibility for all hospitals in Norway, and the state owns the 
public hospitals which are organized into four regional health authorities”. In order to take 
over the responsibilities of the hospitals from the counties, Norway has established four 
regional health authorities which are Helse Sør-Øst, Helse Vest, Helse, Midt-Norge and Helse 
Nord. A regional health authority is a state enterprise responsible for specialist healthcare in 
one of four regions of Norway. The actual performance is done by subsidiary health trusts. 
The authorities are subordinate to the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services 
(Stigen, 2010; Iversen & Kopperud, 2005, p.1231-1238).  
 
Therefore, the four regional health authorities and the health trusts play major roles in the 




1.4 What are sector political goals of Norwegian health trusts? 
 
Many state-owned enterprises were established in order to coordinate the national economy 
and accomplish other policies or political goals rather than pure for-profit goals, as Professor 
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Qi Duojun (1996) concluded in his famous paper. The most important point of the 
establishment of state-owned health enterprises is to facilitate the implementation of health 
policies, in order to achieve the long-term national interests and to profit from the health 
industry. Health sector political goals mainly relate to the health policy issues such as quality, 
fairness, welfare, efficiency and cost control of health care. 
 
Particularly for the Norwegian health trusts (mainly refer to public hospital trusts), the general 
principles of their sector political goals are shown as the description of the Norwegian 
Ministry of Health and Care Services Web site as follows: 
• Promoting public health and counteracting illness, injury, suffering and disability  
• Providing equal services adapted to patients' needs  
• Ensuring quality in health care services  
• Securing patients' access to services  
• Ensuring the best possible use of resources 
 
Specific health sector political goals will focus to such as cost control, improvement of 
service quality, improvement of patients’ satisfaction, reduction of waiting time and other 
issues in different periods and regions. 
 
The Ministry of Health and Care Services has the overall responsibility for government policy 
on health and care services in Norway. In other words, the Ministry of Health and Care 
Services is the “sector”, which manages the HFs through the four regional health authorities 
(RHFs). The HFs and RHFs are mainstays to implement the health policies and then achieve 
health sector political goals, through which the Norwegian government provides health 
services to the residents. 
 
The other goals of the health trusts are business goals, which aim to pursue profits and the 
interests of the enterprises their own. Business goals are the most important objectives for 
private enterprises. However, due to the nature of Norwegian health trusts, their sector 
political goals should theoretically dominate business goals. There are always some problems 
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in terms of tradeoff and priority setting between multiple goals in the health trusts. 
 
Compared to business goals, the achievements of sector political goals of health trusts are 
harder to be measured and evaluated, whereas the achievements of business goals are usually 
explicit and clear. 
 
 
1.5 Who are board members of Norwegian health trusts? 
 
The government or superior authorities are not able to control and manage state-owned 
enterprises directly at every moment. Hence the government or relevant superior authorities 
establish boards of directors to carry out the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises. 
The superior authorities can supervise and control some important decision-makings and 
macro strategies of SOEs through the boards, in order to ensure that the SOEs will pursue 
sector political goals. Regarding the responsibilities of SOE boards, according to the report of 
OECD (2005, p.47), the boards of state-owned enterprises should have the necessary authority, 
competencies and objectivity to carry out their function of strategic guidance and monitoring 
of management. They should act with integrity and be held accountable for their actions. 
 
Because of the state ownership of SOEs, the majority of SOE board members are appointed 
by governments or their superior authorities. Most of SOE board members (the HF board 
members as well) are politicians and representatives of the superior authorities or political 
parties (Ludvigsen, 2010, p.15-17. and also see Helse bergen HF Web site). Meanwhile, the 
other component of the Norwegian SOE board members is the employee representatives. 
According to Norwegian laws, companies with more than 30 employees are entitled to elect 
employee representatives on to the board of directors. Overall, in Norway, “companies with 
more than 200 employees should in principle have…. a corporate assembly as well as a board. 
The corporate assembly normally has 12 members, with two-thirds elected by the 
shareholders (refer to the state if in SOE) and one third elected by and from the employees”, 
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and “the right to elect employee representatives as directors is contained in a number of 
different laws, but most forms of company are covered, as are a number of state agencies” 
(ETUI, 2010 and more detailed information see Hagen, 2008). 
 
Specifically, the boards of HFs mainly consist of politicians appointed by the superior 
authorities and employee representatives elected by the employees. For instance, in Bergen 
Hospital Trust (Helse Bergen), the Chairman and other formal board members are politicians 
who are representatives of the Labor Party, the Progress Party and other political parties, as 
well as a representative of the Western Norway Regional Health Authority; and the employee 
representatives are mainly medical professionals such as Special Nurse, Auxiliary, Consultant 
MD, Midwives, Psychologist Specialist and IT consultant.  
 
 
1.6 Conceptual framework 
 
The analyses in my thesis are at the micro, “group of individuals”, level. This is the level 
where I can effectively analyze how the HF board members consider the related questions, 
and what factors are underlying in their opinions. During the analyses, I will mainly use 
statistical methods, which will categorize the respondents into different groups according to 
their personal features, to explore the differences of opinions among the groups and what the 
differences indicate. Since the main basis of the analyses is questionnaire data, the analyses 
are suitable to use statistical methods of univariate analysis (descriptive statistics) and 
comparison analysis (group comparison) (Chang, 2002, p.2). 
 
In order to research the issues of sector political goals and corporate governance, the survey 
program selected respondents and built the questionnaire based on corporate governance 
theories and mechanism. The questionnaire detected respondents’ opinions on relevant issues 
such as the importance of sector political goals, frequency of tradeoff, quantification and 
measurement, satisfaction, instruments, responsibility allocation and, etc. (Rattsø and 
 14 
Sørensen, 2010). The univariate analysis (descriptive statistics) will detect the respondents’ 
opinions on these issues. 
 
In order to understand how and why HF board members' certain opinions emerge, it seems 
necessary to identify the most important set of theoretical perspectives in which groups of 
individuals can be seen in, namely, I need to find relevant theories according to which to 
categorize the respondents. To solve the problem it seems most reasonable to look at the two 
different grouping approaches that can have the greatest explanatory power to interpret the 
differences of respondent's opinions. Since the objects of study are the Norwegian HF board 
members, the grouping approaches are, firstly, the ways of their appointments or elections (in 
the view of different logic between appointed board members and employee representatives), 
and, secondly, their professional backgrounds in public or private sectors (in the view of 
different logic between public sectors and private sectors).  
 
Firstly, in the view of the different voters of HF board members, I categorize the respondents 
into two groups—politicians appointed by the superior authorities (or appointed board 
members) and employee representatives elected by the employees. Ludvigsen (2010, p.16) 
concluded in his doctoral dissertation that politicians would mainly seek to please the voters. 
Because of the needs to stay in office, the two groups perhaps have different predilections of 
cognition and action, in order to please the different voters. Regarding the different 
professional properties, politicians’ cognitive orientation may also differ from the medical 
workers’. The logic of this grouping approach is that the appointed politicians should pay 
more attention to the sector political goals, and consider corporate governance on the 
perspective of politics and policies; but the elected employee representatives should consider 
the related issues on the perspective of the interests of the employees and the enterprises, as 
well as medical professions.  
 
Secondly, in the view of professional backgrounds, I categorize the respondents into two 
groups—public sectors and private sectors, since the two sectors care about different interests. 
The respondents’ professional backgrounds with the predilections of the previous sector 
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interests may influence their current cognitive orientations. The logic of this grouping 
approach is the people with professional backgrounds in private sectors probably have more 
concerns about profits and efficiency, because the private sectors are profit-driven, whereas 
the public sectors (governments) operate with a fixed budget (Frederickson, 2003, p.156). The 
people with public sector backgrounds prefer the public and social interests, because in terms 




1.7 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1 is the introduction part of the thesis. This chapter, firstly, presents some 
backgrounds and research questions of the thesis. Secondly, it provides some brief definitions 
and interpretations of three key terms--Norwegian health trusts (HF), sector political goals of 
HFs and board members of HFs, which are very relevant to the following analyses. Then I 
introduce the conceptual framework of my thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical foundations of the thesis, which are corporate governance, 
different logic between appointed board members and elected employee representatives, as 
well as different logic between public sectors and private sectors. Based on the relevant 
literatures and theories, I am able to build several research hypotheses and interpret the 
statistical results I will get. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the data and research methods of the thesis. Firstly, I introduce the status 
of data sources, sample respondents and the questionnaire I used. Secondly, I describe the 
survey and sampling methods of the data, as well as the research methods of the analyses. 
Additionally, I present how I adjust the data of the questionnaire. And finally, I discuss the 
issue of validity and reliability at the end of this chapter. 
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Chapter 4 presents the statistical results from the univariate analyses of the HF board 
members’ opinions on the issues of sector political goals and corporate governance. The 
descriptive statistics present the HF board members’ opinions as one group. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the statistical results from two comparison analyses of the HF board 
members’ opinions on the issues of sector political goals and corporate governance. In 
addition to that, I discuss and interpret the statistical results, in order to inspect whether the 
results are consistent with the research hypotheses I made. The two group comparisons are a 
comparison between appointed board members and elected employees, as well as a 
comparison between board members with public or private sector backgrounds. 
 
Chapter 6 provides my conclusions, comments and recommendations of the findings. The 















2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
The thesis will to a large extent seek answers to the research questions through the theoretical 
foundations, including corporate governance, the different logic between appointed board 
members and employee representatives, as well as the different logic between public sectors 
and private sectors. Most of the theories have emphasized how people (board members) 
recognize and act is affected by their professional backgrounds, academic backgrounds, 
geographical backgrounds, wage levels and other factors, so that they have different cognitive 
orientations. The superior authorities often rely on the personal features of board candidates, 
such as their professional backgrounds, to consider whether they will be suitable and 
compliant (Ludvigsen 2010, p.14).  
 
 
2.1 Corporate governance 
 
The corporate governance theory is the theoretical foundation of building the entire 
questionnaire and the cause of selecting HF board members as the respondents of the survey. 
Meanwhile the theory can also help to interpret the board members’ opinions.  
 
Rattsø and Sørensen (2010) put several issues of corporate governance, including various 
instruments of corporate governance, responsibility allocation of corporate governance, 
competence of corporate governance, role conflicts of board members and liabilities of boards 
into the questionnaire. To explore the HF board members’ opinions on these issues are 
important for improving the future corporate governance of HFs with sector political goals.   
 
Berle and Means (1932) believed the separation of ownership from management (for instance, 
the state which owns HFs cannot make decisions on daily behaviors of the enterprises) is a 
problem. This “problem” may lead to moral hazard and the agency problem. According to 
market mechanism and “Economic Man” hypothesis, enterprises including state-owned 
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enterprises are willing to pursue profits (business goals), which will be in conflict with the 
political goals of the substantial shareholder (the state). The establishment of boards in 
state-owned enterprises is an approach to monitor the managers, in order to reduce the risk of 
the agency problem and ensure the implementation of sector political goals (Qi, 1996).  
 
According to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises 
(2005), the general responsibility of the boards of state-owned enterprises is strategic 
guidance and monitoring of management. One important point of these strategic works is the 
priority setting among multiple goals, and to monitor the implementation of this priority. 
Therefore, it is really important to understand the HF board members’ opinions on issues of 
corporate governance, as well as sector political goals. 
 
 
2.2 Different logic between appointed board members and elected 
employee representatives 
 
According to the foregoing introduction, the HF board members who appointed by the sector 
are always so called politicians, whereas the employee representatives of the HF boards are 
often playing the roles as medical workers at the same time. In order to understand the 
different logic between appointed board members and elected employee representatives, I will 
seek answers through the motivations of politicians and medical workers.  
 
According to Ludvigsen’s (2010, p.22-29) description, there are three logic (motivation) 
models of politicians which are reputation, re-election and ideology. 
 
In the reputation model, politicians always want to get a good performance, in order to obtain 
reputations and recognitions from the public, which is in line with Herzberg's (1959) 
motivation factors of Achievement and Recognition. This motivation is also in accordance 
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with the need for achievements in McClelland’s Model (1985). This is due to on one hand 
politicians want to please the voters through a good performance in order to stay in office 
(Wittman, 1995); on the other hand, politicians may want to meet the needs of esteem and 
self-actualization (Maslow, 1943). Thus, according to these needs of politicians, the HF board 
members who are appointed by the superior authorities should theoretically have more 
concerns about the achievements of sector political goals, which are highly related to their 
performance in the view of their voters and the public.  
 
In the re-election model, the politicians have a motivation to stay in office. This motivation is 
in line with the needs of job security and personal growth of Herzberg’s (1959) theory. For 
this purpose, pleasing the voters is inevitable. Therefore, compared with the employee 
representatives, the board members appointed by superior authorities should be more inclined 
to please the authorities, and they pay more attention to the interests of their voters rather than 
of the enterprises their own.  
 
Regarding the employee representatives, they have the same needs to pursue achievements 
and stay in office. Therefore, the logic of employee representatives is probably that the 
enterprises and employees are their concerns, since OECD (2005, p.50) described employee 
representatives of SOE boards "should act in the best interests of the company and treat all 
shareholders equitably"，namely, they are responsible for the benefits of the enterprises. 
Hence theoretically, compared with the politicians, employee representatives may pay more 
attention to business goals which are directly related to the benefits of the enterprises their 
own.   
 
According to the above difference of logic, I made Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1: In the Norwegian health trusts, the appointed board members pay more 
attention to sector political goals, whereas the elected employee representatives pay more 
attention to business goals. 
 
In the ideology model, the ideology orientation is also an important logic consideration for 
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politicians. Ludvigsen (2010, p.27) referenced Hibbs’ (1977, p.1467-1487) view to present 
that politicians are concerned about specific social groups to represent their interests and their 
well-beings. Compared with the employee representatives, since many HF board members 
appointed by superior authorities are representatives of different political parties, therefore 
they will be more likely to represent the interests of specific social groups if there is a conflict 
of interests. The logic of the appointed board members is that, as politicians, they care more 
about the interests of the health sector which are their interested group. However, the 
employee representatives will have more concerns about the interests of the enterprises, the 
employees and even the medical professions rather than the sector, as OECD (2005) defined. 
Since employee representatives are elected by the employees, they should be responsible for 
the interests of employees, which is the same as the motivation that politicians would like to 
please their voters.  
 
According to this difference of logic, I made Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2: If conflicting interests exist in the Norwegian health trusts, the appointed board 
members will be more likely to represent the interests of the health sector, whereas the 
employee representatives will be more likely to represent the interests of the enterprises their 
own（business interests）. 
 
In addition, politicians want to “stay in office because politicians might have a taste for 
wielding power or that they like to enjoy the perquisites that come with the job” (Ludvigsen, 
2010, p.25. and more detailed see Maskin and Tirole, 2004, p.1034-1054) and people have the 
need for power (McClelland, 1985). Therefore I assume that politicians are interested in 
pursuing “power” to control the others and “autonomy” to use the “power” without restriction. 
They also probably have more consciousness of responsibilities on the issues of corporate 
governance, since responsibilities always adhere to powers. More powers and autonomies 
mean more responsibilities.  
 
According to this logic, I make Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3: The appointed board members of the Norwegian health trusts have more 
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consciousness of responsibility, power and autonomy on the issues of corporate governance, 
compared with the employee representatives. 
 
As the majority of employee representatives of the HF boards are engaged in medical 
occupations, the two roles are inevitable to affect each other. Compared with the managerial 
logic, the logic of medical workers is more inclined to micro and individual perspective, and 
they prefer personal responsibility, immediate feedback and negotiation, according to a 
conclusion of Freidson’s (1972) book. Because of the different occupational habits and 
perspectives (micro vs. macro), compared with the politicians, the employee representatives 
of HF boards may have different cognition on some issues of corporate governance such as 
responsibility. 
 
According to this logic, I make Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4: The employee representatives of the Norwegian health trusts prefer micro，




2.3 Different logic between public sectors and private sectors 
 
In the view of cognitive theory, people’s experiences, needs, personalities and other 
characteristics will affect their opinions (Shi, 1998). Similarly, the board members’ opinions 
on political issues also relate to their personal characteristics, as Agrawal and Knoeber (2001, 
p.179-207.) believed political affiliation might exist, for example, through the director's 
primary occupation or the director's academic background. Therefore, I assume that the 
different professional backgrounds of HF board members in public sectors or private sectors 
can lead their different opinions on the issues of sector political goals and corporate 
governance, even though they are playing the same roles as SOE board members at present. 
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Depending on public goods, quasi-public goods or private goods (Samuelson, 1954) which of 
them to provide, social sectors are categorized into three parts. Broadly speaking, the public 
sectors should include "pure" public sectors and "quasi" public sectors (Hu, 2001). Therefore, 
in accordance with the dichotomy either public or private, all social sectors can be categorized 
into two categories, namely public sectors and private sectors. The goal settings of public 
sectors differ to those of private sectors, so that people with professional backgrounds in 
different sectors probably have different cognitive orientations. For instance, Osborne et al. 
(1996, p.21) pointed out that governments and enterprises are fundamentally different 
organizations. There is a tendency of civism in the values of public sectors, as Frederickson 
(2003, p.156) said that people with civism preference have a greater spirit of philanthropy and 
public benefits, and people with a selfish preference feel more interested in private business 
activities to seek economic benefits. 
 
According to this difference of logic, I made Hypothesis 5. 
Hypothesis 5: If conflicting interests exist in the Norwegian health trusts, the board members 
with professional backgrounds in public sectors will be more likely to represent the public 
interests, whereas the board members with professional backgrounds in private sectors will be 
more likely to represent the business interests. 
 
In the view of management of public vs. private sectors, Rosenbloom (2002) pointed out that 
although public management is quite similar with business (private) management, there are 
lots of differences in their core concepts. The differences between public management and 
business management are based on the different attributes between public sectors and private 
sectors. Generally speaking, public sectors prefer public benefits, non-profit and service (Lou 
and Zheng, 2002, p.14-26), whereas private sectors pursue private benefits and profits. Tang 
(2005) referred Nutt and Backoff’s (1992) book listing some factors reflecting the differences 
between public and private sectors such as the market environment, political environment, 
coercion, coverage, public scrutiny, ownership, targets, rights and performance expectations. 
 
Specifically, the differences of logic between the two sectors are as below: Public sectors 
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pursue social benefits and public benefits, whereas private sectors pursue private benefits; 
Public sectors are non-profit, whereas private sectors aim to profits; The activities of public 
sectors must be in accordance with laws and be subject to a high degree of supervision, 
whereas the activities of private sectors are less restricted; The goals of public sectors are hard 
to be measured and quantified with diversified responsibilities, whereas the goals of private 
sectors are very specific; Public sectors have strong political attributes, whereas private 
sectors do not have (Zhang and Lu, 2010; Lou and Zheng, 2002; MBA Library, 2011). 
 
According to this difference of logic, I made Hypothesis 6. 
Hypothesis 6: In the Norwegian health trusts, the board members with professional 
backgrounds in public sectors pay more attention to sector political goals, whereas the board 
members with professional backgrounds in private sectors pay more attention to business 
goals. 
 
In addition, the funds of public sectors are mainly based on government finance with weak 
market information and signals, whereas private sectors profit through market competitions 
with strong market information and signals (Tang, 2005). Due to this big difference of their 
financial sources, private sectors pay more attention to efficiency, while public sectors place a 
great emphasis on the consciousness of responsibility. The board members’ working 
experiences in different sectors may lead to different cognition on the issues of corporate 
governance, such as different predilections of instruments to achieve goals.   
 
According to this difference of logic, I made Hypothesis 7.  
Hypothesis 7: In the Norwegian health trusts, the board members with professional 
backgrounds in private sectors prefer economic and market instruments to achieve sector 
political goals, whereas the board members with professional backgrounds in public sectors 




3 DATA AND METHODS 
 
3.1 The data source and sampling  
 
The data source of this thesis is from the survey program "Management of State-owned 
enterprises with sector political goals" by Jørn Rattsø (NTNU) and Rune J. Sørensen (BI). 
The target population of this program is board members of Norwegian state-owned 
enterprises to explore their opinions on relevant issues of sector political goals and corporate 
governance. The interested targets of the whole program include Norwegian state-owned 
enterprises of electric power, postal services, railway transportation, natural properties, health 
care, public infrastructure, etc. The part of data about health trusts was selected to be used in 
this thesis. 
 
The survey includes all board members of the four regional health authorities and their 
subsidiaries (Health trusts). A detailed list of the relevant health trusts is as follows:  
 
Table 2. A list of the Health Trusts 
 
Names of the authorities Names of the subsidiaries 
Southern and Eastern Norway Regional 
Health Authority 
Akershus University Hospital Trust  
Hospital pharmacy enterprise  
Innlandet Hospital Trust  
Vestfold Psyciatric Hospital Trust  
Oslo University Hospital Trust  
Sunnaas Hospital Trust  
Sørlandet Hospital Trust  
Telemark Hospital Trust  
Vestfold Hospital Trust  
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Vestre Viken Hospital Trust  
Østfold Hospital Trust 
Western Norway Regional Health 
Authority 
Bergen Hospital Trust  
Fonna Hospital Trust  
Førde Hospital Trust  
Stavanger Hospital Trust  
Trust Apoteka Vest (Hospital Pharmacies) 
Northern Norway Regional Health 
Authority 
Finnmark Hospital Trust  
Helgeland Hospital Trust  
Hålogaland Hospital Trust  
Nordland Hospital Trust  
Northern Norway Pharmaceutical Trust  
University Hospital of North Norway 
Central Norway Regional Health 
Authority 
Central Norway Pharmaceutical Trust  
Nordmøre and Romsdal Hospital Trust  
Nord-Trøndelag Hospital Trust  
St. Olav's Hospital Trust  
Sunnmøre Hospital Trust 
 
The survey provided more than 400 questionnaires to the HF board members, and took back 
164 valid questionnaires with answering rate 0.39.   
 
My investigation is a type of complete survey, and the program has sent questionnaires to the 
entire target population which is all of the HF board members. 
 
 
3.2 A description of the sample respondents 
 
The general personal features of the samples of respondents are shown as follows, 
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(1) There are totally 164 valid samples. 
 
(2) Gender. There are 85 males who account for 51.8% of all samples, and 79 females 
constituted 48.2%.  
 
(3) Age. There are 3 persons younger than 30 years old, 9 persons between 30 and 39 years 
old, 44 persons between 40 to 49 years old, 62 persons between 50 to 59 years old, and 45 
persons 60 years old and older. Therefore, it seems most of Norwegian HF board members are 
between 50 and 59 years old accounting for 37.8% of all, according to the samples.  
 
(4) Region. There are 69 persons from the Southern and Eastern Norway Regional Health 
Authority, 34 persons from the western authority, 28 persons from the northern authority and 
33 from the central authority.  
 
(5) Position on board. There are 14 chairmen of boards, 76 formal board members and 69 
employee representatives.  
 
(6) Seniority of the board. Majority of all samples (33 persons) have worked as board 
members for three years, 28 persons for four years, 24 persons for five years and 5 persons for 
more than 10 years. The shortest sample has worked less than one year, whereas the longest 
sample has 45 years of experience. 
 
(7) Professional background. There are 35 persons from private business, 7 persons from 
organizations or trusts, 51 persons from municipal or county agencies, 46 persons from 
government activities and 23 from other public sectors. 
 
(8) Previous experience as a board member. 62 persons have work experiences in boards of 
private sectors, 43 persons in other governmental activities and 118 persons in trade unions, 
political parties or other types of organizations. 11 persons have experiences as members of 
parliaments and 3 persons as ministers or secretaries of the State. 68 persons have work 
 27 
experiences in municipalities or counties and 25 persons select the “other” option.  
 
3.3 A description of the questionnaire 
 
The first three parts of the questionnaire are relevant to my research.  
 
The questions of the first part involve feature information of a respondent, including gender, 
age, region, position on the board, chief or deputy, seniority on the board, professional 
background and previous experience as a board member.  
 
The questions of the second part talk about the respondents’ opinions on the issues of sector 
political goals, including:  
 
(1) Importance of sector political goals versus business goals;  
(2) Frequency of tradeoffs on conflicting sector political goals;  
(3) Extent of the achievements of the sector political tasks to be measured and quantified;  
(4) Satisfaction of their own with the achievements of sector political goals and business 
goals; 
(5) Satisfaction of the Ministry with the achievements of sector political goals and business 
goals; 
(6) Importance of various instruments to achieve sector political goals.  
 
The questions of the third part talk about the respondents’ opinions on the issues of corporate 
governance, including:  
 
(1) Agree or disagree with various statements of corporate governance;  
(2) Passive or active corporate governance from the Ministry; 
(3) Competence of corporate governance from the Ministry; 
(4) Choice if conflicting interests exist;  
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(5) Liabilities of the boards for the HF goals. 
 
3.4 Survey Methods and Research Methods  
 
The program used the method of paper questionnaires, and each set included a cover letter, a 
questionnaire and an envelope for returning the questionnaire. Additionally used email to 
inform and remind the respondents to complete and return the questionnaire timely. It then 
commissioned a statistics company to recall questionnaires and input the data to an Excel file. 
Finally, I transferred the relevant part of data from Excel to SPSS by which I could start the 
statistical analyses.  
 
The thesis is mainly based on quantitative (statistical) methods. Common statistical methods 
include descriptive statistics, group comparisons, correlations, regressions, etc. (Ma et al, 
2008). Since the survey aims to explore respondents’ opinions or attitudes, descriptive 
statistics and group comparisons could be better choices as analysis approaches (Chang, 2002), 
through which I can speculate the mean attitudes and the differences of opinions of the target 
population. Finally, I will interpret the obtained statistical results of the differences of 
opinions and analyze whether to keep or reject the research hypotheses. 
 
Firstly, the descriptive statistics will describe the status of frequency, percentage, mean, 
median, standard deviation, etc. of the sample data for all the relevant questions in the 
questionnaire, to illustrate the opinions of the sample HF board members on the issues of 
sector political goals and corporate governance.  
 
Secondly, the group comparison approach will explore whether the differences of opinions 
among groups are statistically significant by the Non-parametric Tests. The reasons for using 
Non-parametric Tests are because of the small sample size (164), as well as non-normal 
distributions of the data in each group. I will not use the T-test and other mean comparison 
methods which require normal distributions of data strictly (Ma et al, 2008, p.79). The 
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non-parametric methods base on the values of ranks or medians instead of means to compare 
different groups of data.  
 
Finally, I will use the conclusions and theories of relevant literatures to interpret the statistical 




3.5 Data adjustments  
 
For some statistical and theoretical considerations, I need to adjust several raw data: 
 
(1) Adjust the answers of 'I don't know' to the system missing. According to the questionnaire 
setting, the use of numbers from 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (6) indicate the degrees of agreement or 
disagreement to the questions in descending sort. However, the "I do not know" options, 
which always come in after the “strongly disagree” options, are indicated by the greatest 
numbers, that is clearly not reasonable if using the numbers in statistics. Thus, I will transfer 
the answers of "I don't know" options to the “system missing”, in order to avoid those options 
to interfere with the statistic results such as values of mean and median. 
 
(2) Adjust the three options of the elected ways of board members to two options, which 
categorize the respondents as board members appointed by the superior authorities and 
employee representatives elected by the employees respectively. Because the thesis aims to 
explore the different opinions between appointed and elected board members, and the 
Chairmen of boards are also appointed by the superior authorities, there is no need to explore 
the differences among the three groups. In a view of statistical point, a comparison test 
between two groups is simpler than that among three groups, and I can set a higher significant 
level to get more valuable statistical results (Ma et al, 2008, p.185).  
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(3) Adjust the six options of the professional backgrounds of board members to two options, 
which categorize the respondents as board members with professional backgrounds in private 
and public sectors respectively. The reasons of this adjustment are the same as the previous 
adjustment. Theoretically, I can treat organizations or foundations, municipal or county 
agencies, governments and other public organizations as public sectors.  
 
 
3.6 Validity and reliability  
 
Regarding the quality of the thesis, I need to consider, firstly, the issues of validity which 
depends on data appropriateness and validity for the research question, and secondly, the 
issues of reliability which refers to something about the accuracy of the process measurement 
of data (Mtamakaya, 2008, p.17). This thesis mainly uses quantitative methods with the data 
of a questionnaire, and thus the relevant issues of reliability and validity which should be 
considered are 1) stability which refers to whether a measure is stable over time; 2) internal 
reliability which refers to whether the indicators that make up the scale or index are 
consistent; 3) inter- observer consistency which need to be considered when a great deal of 
subjective judgment is involved in the translation of data into categories; 4) internal validity 
which refers to whether a conclusion that incorporates a causal relationship between two or 
more variables holds water; 5) external validity which refers to whether the results of a study 
can be generalized beyond the specific research context; 6) ecological validity which refers to 
whether social scientific findings are applicable to people’s everyday , natural social settings 
and 7) measurement validity which refers to whether a measure is reliable (Bryman, 2008, 
p.149-151, p.32-33). 
 
Generally speaking, the reliability of the data can be guaranteed, since the authors of the 
questionnaire I used are creditable; in other words, I use a kind of secondary data. Professor 
Jørn Rattsø (NTNU) and professor Rune J. Sørensen (BI) designed and constructed the 
sampling methods and the questionnaire which I used. When I started to join in the survey 
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program, the formal questionnaire has already been formed. The retest reliability (stability) 
and internal reliability should be tested and guaranteed, since my work just started with 
distributing the formal questionnaires to the target respondents. Furthermore, although there 
seems to be no conflicting statistical results of several indicators to measure the same issue, I 
still interpreted the statistical results carefully, in order to reduce the possibility of internal 
unreliability. Finally, the problem of inter-observer consistency seems not relevant to my 
research, since the questionnaire is not involved in a great deal of subjective judgment in the 
translation of data into categories (Bryman, 2008, p.150). 
 
Based on my review of many literatures, I established my measure apparently reflects the 
content of the concept in question and deduced seven hypotheses from relevant theories. 
Therefore, I believe my research have a good measurement validity. I have tried to make 
conclusions incorporating causal relationships with the academic knowledge of my 
seven-year higher education and the sampling method of the data is a type of complete survey, 
which covers the entire target population; hence the internal validity and external validity of 
my research can be guaranteed. Due to the content of my research and the question setting of 












4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLES 
 
This chapter will present the statistical results of the opinions of the HF board members as a 
whole, on the issues of sector political goals and corporate governance of the questionnaire. 
 
4.1 Opinions on sector political goals 
 
(1) The respondents believe sector political goals are slightly more important than business 
goals, since the mean value 3.44 is greater than 3 which is the value of neutral attitude of this 
question.  
 
(2) The respondents believe they often make tradeoffs on conflicting sector political goals, 
since the mean value 2.26 is less than 2.5 (the value of neutral attitude).  
 
(3) The respondents believe the achievements of sector political goals are measured and 
quantified to a quite large extent, since the mean value 2.34 is less than 2.5 (the value of 
neutral attitude).  
 
(4) The respondents feel quite satisfied with both the achievements of business goals and 
sector political goals, since the two mean values are both less than 3 (the value of neutral 
attitude). In addition, the respondents feel more satisfied with the achievements of business 
goals than of sector political goals; because the mean value 2.19 of business goals is less than 
2.78 of sector political goals, and 50 respondents are satisfied with the achievements of 
business goals, whereas only eight respondents are satisfied with the other. 
 
(5) The respondents believe the superior authority feel quite satisfied with both the 
achievements of business goals and sector political goals, since the two mean values are both 
less than 3 (the value of neutral attitude). In addition, the respondents believe the superior 
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authority feel more satisfied with the achievements of business goals than of sector political 
goals, because the mean value 2.11 of business goals is less than 2.41 of sector political goals.  
 
Combining the results of (4) and (5), both the HF board members and the superior authorities 
feel quite satisfied with the two types of goals. However, the satisfaction level of the 
achievements of business goals is slightly higher than that of the achievements of sector 
political goals. The result indicates that HFs need to pay more attention to sector political 
goals, as the core goals, and improve the instruments to achieve the goals. Meanwhile the 
results also indicate that compared to the sector political goals, the business goals of HFs are 
easier to be measured and achieved. 
 
(6) The samples of HF board members believe the instruments of legislation, regulations and 
any licensing requirement; Priorities of the sector's Letter of Commitment; corporate 
governance of the sector through meetings; The sector's approval of important decisions; 
Orders from state supervision and control organs; Notes / instructions from the Office of the 
Auditor and Board composition and expertise are important to achieve sector political goals, 
since all of the mean values of above questions are less than 2.5 (the value of neutral attitude), 
whereas the instruments of Competition for government contracts and Control signals through 
the media are not important. 
 
 
4.2 Opinions on corporate governance  
 
(1) The respondents disagree with the statements that the sector’s governance is limited to the 
general assembly; sector’s governance takes place through informal contact with the 
Chairman / Board; the sector’s governance takes place through direct contact with the 
director and the sector’s governance is invisible because the management adapt to changing 
political signal, since all of the mean values of above questions are greater than 3 (the value 
of neutral attitude). 
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The respondents quite agree to the statements that the sector's governance in addition to the 
Annual General Meeting takes place through Grant /implements settings / Letter of 
Commitment; the sector's governance takes place through formal meetings with the Chairman 
/Board and Major issues are presented to the sector before decision, since all of the mean 
values of above questions are less than 3 (the value of neutral attitude). 
 
(2) The respondents believe the sector is active in corporate governance, since the mean value 
2.25 is greater than 2 (the value of neutral attitude).  
 
(3) The respondents believe the corporate governance is competent and contribute something 
to improve the achievements of goals in the activities, since the mean value 2.14 is less than 
2.5 (the value of neutral attitude).  
 
(4) If conflicting interests exist between public and business interests, the respondents will 
mainly choose to represent public interests rather than the business interests, since the mean 
value 2.57 is less than 3 (the value of neutral attitude).  
 
If conflicting interests exist between the sector’s interests and the public interests, it is very 
hard to identify whose interests the respondents will represent, since the mean value 3.05 is 
approximately equal to 3.  
 
If conflicting interests exist between the sector’s interests and business interests, the 
respondents will mainly choose to represent the business interests rather than the sector's 
interests, since the mean value 2.15 is less than 3. 
 
(5) The respondents quite agree to the statements that if lack of achievements, the Board will 
be criticized by public for not having done its job and the Board will not be re-appointed, 




The respondents do not have a clear attitude on the statement that if lack of achievement, the 
Board will be thrown, since the mean value 2.98 is approximately equal to 3. 
 
The respondents disagree with the statements that if lack of achievement, the directors will be 
addressed litigation and the Board will in reality never be held responsible, since both of the 
























5 GROUP COMPARISONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
5.1 Comparison between appointed board members and elected 
employee representatives 
5.1.1 Differences of opinions on sector political goals 
 
(1) The statistical results of this group comparison are shown as Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Statistical results of the group comparison between appointed board members and  
elected employee representatives on the issues of sector political goals (1st part) 
 
 Appointed group Elected group 
Item name N Medi
an 





vs. business        
goals 
89 4 3.42 
(1.085) 






88 2 2.25 
(0.699) 







89 2 2.22 
(0.538) 







90 2 2.18 
(1.147) 




4.2 Self  
political 
satisfaction 
88 2 2.60 
(1.023) 







90 1 2.10 
(1.122) 







88 2 2.30 
(0.805) 






85 1 1.47 
(0.589) 





Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed). *<0.1 level, **<0.05 level, ***<0.01 level 
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Table 1 (2nd part) 
 
 Appointed group Elected group 
Item name N Medi
an 








82 2 2.24 
(0.794) 





6.3 Letter of 
Commitment 
82 2 1.62 
(0.660) 







76 2 2.36 
(0.860) 







73 3 2.81 
(0.908) 




6.6 Meetings 84 2 1.88 
(0.735) 






79 2 2.48 
(0.798) 




6.8 Media 83 3 3.00 
(0.733) 






83 2 2.02 
(0.855) 







84 2 1.64 
(0.633) 







80 2 1.82 
(0.776) 






83 2 1.66 
(0.649) 





Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed). *<0.1 level, **<0.05 level, ***<0.01 level 
 
On the Question 1 Importance of sector political goals versus business goals, there are no 
significantly different opinions between the two groups (p = 0.379). Although I assume the 
employee representatives will pay more attention to business goals, the statistical result 
indicates the majority of HF board members believe that the sector political goals are more 
important. The employee representatives do not have a distinct preference for business goals. 
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I may conclude that, in principle, as state-owned enterprises, sector political goals of HFs 
dominate business goals.  
 
On the Question 2 Frequency of tradeoff on conflicting sector political goals, there are no 
significantly different opinions between the two groups (p = 0.687). The result suggests that 
both the appointed board members and employee representatives often deal with issues 
related to multiple political goals in their daily work. Since the question does not involve the 
comparison with business goals and just describes the actual status, there is no significant 
difference between the two groups.  
 
On the Question 3 "Extent of the achievements of the sector political tasks to be measured 
and quantified", the difference of opinions between the appointed board members and the 
employee representatives are statistically significant (p = 0.002). Compared to the employee 
representatives, the appointed board members believe to a larger extent that the achievements 
of the sector political tasks to be measured and quantified. Although the extent of the 
measurement and quantification is an objective reality, the two groups of respondents still 
have different opinions on this question. I believe this result is consistent with the description 
of the first part of Hypothesis 1; namely, compared to the employee representatives, the 
appointed board members pay more attention to sector political goals. Because the 
achievements of sector political tasks are difficult to be measured and quantified, the 
processes and results of the measurement and quantification are often complicated, unclear 
and ambiguous. Only the persons who focus and pay more attention to the sector political 
goals can have a deeper and more accurate understanding of the measurement. The statistical 
result, which the appointed board members believe a larger extent of measurement than the 
employee representatives believe it, indicates that the appointed board members have a more 
in-depth understanding of the methods, processes and results of the measurement and 
quantification, and they have observed more than the employee representatives. The more 
in-depth understanding of political objectives indicates that sector political tasks are 
momentous tasks for the appointed board members. In addition, the employee representatives, 
as medical workers who have a more specific and micro logic, probably can only observe the 
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clear and direct processes and results of the measurements, whereas politicians observe them 
on a more broad and macro perspective. 
 
On the Question 4.1 Satisfaction of their own with the achievements of business goals, there 
are no significantly different opinions between the two groups (p = 0.583). The result 
indicates that compare with sector political goals, the achievements of business goals are 
easier to be measured and the business outcomes are clear, direct and explicit. The different 
logic of the two groups can hardly impact their satisfactions with the business achievements. 
 
On the Question 4.2 "Satisfaction of their own with the achievements of sector political goals", 
the difference of opinions between the appointed board members and the employee 
representatives are statistically significant (p = 0.013). Compared to the employee 
representatives, the appointed board members feel more satisfied with the achievements of the 
sector political goals. Similarly with the previous issue, the different logic of the two groups 
of respondents bring about different opinions, since the achievements of sector political goals 
are often complicated, unclear and ambiguous. The statistical result suggests that the 
appointed board members have a deeper understanding of the political achievements, since 
they pay more attention to the political goals. In addition, due to the motivation which 
politicians pursue reputations (Ludvigsen, 2010, p.24), some appointed board members 
probably gave the answers with higher satisfaction, to show the better performances and 
achievements of their concerned tasks.  
 
On the two questions (Question 5.1 and Question 5.2) Satisfaction of the superior authorities 
with the achievements of sector political goals and business goals, there are no significantly 
different opinions between the two groups (p = 0.763 & 0.156). Since the two questions let 
the responders guess the satisfaction of the sector (the Ministry), I think the respondents 
mainly based on the previous experiences of evaluations to answer the questions. Therefore, 
the different logic of the two groups can hardly impact their opinions. 
 
On the Question 6 "Importance of various instruments to achieve sector political goals", there 
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are four statistically significant differences of opinions between the two groups. The 
employee representatives believe "earmarking" of state spending on specific assignments (p 
<0.01), control signals through the media (p = 0.010) and the sector's approval of important 
decisions (p = 0.034) are more important to achieve sector political goals than the appointed 
board member believe they are, whereas the appointed board member believe priorities of the 
sector's Letter of Commitment (p = 0.045) are more important than the employee 
representatives believe they are.  
 
The result that the employee representatives believe "earmarking" of state spending on 
specific assignments is more important than the appointed board member believe it is, 
probably indicates that the employee representatives as medical professions consider sector 
political goals on a more specific and micro perspective. They prefer to divide sector political 
tasks into several units of assignments, and complete these specific assignments by 
"earmarking" of state spending. The result also shows that the employee representatives prefer 
to follow the guidelines of the state to decide which specific political tasks need to be 
achieved, rather than they identify the tasks themselves. 
 
The statistical result that the employee representatives prefer the instrument of media also 
reflects their preferences for specific, micro and technical instruments such as media. 
 
The result that the employee representatives prefer the sector's approval of important 
decisions can be seen their cautious attitude to the responsibility of sector political goals. As 
medical workers tend to personal responsibility (Freidson, 1972), but their core tasks are not 
sector political tasks, hence the employee representatives prefer the sector making decisions 
of important sector political tasks, thereby to shift the burden and responsibility of these tasks. 
The result also proves that the appointed board members are more willing to make decisions 
and shoulder the responsibility.  
 
The result that the appointed board members prefer priorities of the sector's Letter of 
Commitment indicates that they prefer this traditional political instrument.  
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According to the above analyses on the issue of "Importance of various instruments to 
achieve sector political goals", I can keep the Hypothesis 4: In Norwegian health trusts, 
compared with the appointed board members, the employee representatives prefer micro，
specific and technical instruments to achieve sector political goals. 
 
However, on eight of the twelve questions Importance of various instruments to achieve 
sector political goals, there are no significantly different opinions between the two groups. 
These results indicate that there are few significant cognitive differences on the various 
instruments to achieve sector political goals between the two groups. However, according to 
the results and analyses in the previous section, the employee representatives have a 
preference for specific, micro and technical instruments. 
 
(2) Summary 
According to the above analyses, I can conclude that the appointed board members pay more 
attention to sector political goals. The appointed board members tend to consider the process 
and outcome of sector political tasks on a macro and broad perspective, whereas the employee 
representatives tend to consider the issues on a micro and specific perspective. These results 
correspond with the motivations of politicians and medical workers respectively.  
 
I will keep the Hypothesis 4, but reject the Hypothesis 1, because there is no apparent 
evidence to prove that the employee representatives pay more attention to business goals. 
However, I can only accept the first part of Hypothesis 1 as in the Norwegian health trusts, 
compared with the employee representatives, the appointed board members pay more 
attention to sector political goals 
 
 
5.1.2 Differences of opinions on corporate governance 
 
(1) The statistical results of this group comparison are shown as Table 4. 
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Table 4. Statistical results of the group comparison between appointed board members and  
elected employee representatives on the issues of corporate governance 
 
 Appointed group Elected group 







82 4 3.66 
(1.381) 






86 1 1.63 
(0.827) 






86 2 2.00 
(1.085) 




7.4 Present to 
the sector 
81 2 2.07 
(1.160) 






83 3 3.08 
(1.271) 






81 3 2.93 
(1.394) 




7.7 Invisible 77 4 3.91 
(1.161) 




8 Passive or 
active 
85 2 2.35 
(0.571) 






81 2 2.04 
(0.580) 






83 2 2.72 
(1.243) 




10.2 Sector  
Vs. Public 
82 3 2.66 
(1.102) 






87 2 2.45 
(1.118) 






89 2 1.97 
(1.112) 






88 2 2.39 
(1.011) 




11.3 Thrown 87 3 2.83 
(1.081) 




11.4 litigation 74 5 4.53 
(0.925) 






88 4 3.74 
(1.335) 





Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed). *<0.1 level, **<0.05 level, ***<0.01 level 
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On the issue of "Agree or disagree to various statements of corporate governance" (from 
Question 7.1 to Question 7.7), there is only one statistically significant difference of opinions 
between the two groups. Compared to the employee representatives, the appointed board 
members more agree to the statement that the sector's governance in addition to Annual 
General Meeting takes place through grant, implements settings, and letter of commitment (p 
= 0.046). The listed statements of the issue emphasize the ways through which the sector 
governance HFs. There are no significant different opinions on most of the statements 
between the two groups of respondents, except that the appointed board members prefer this 
statement than the employee representatives. The statistical result indicates that the appointed 
board members have a deeper understanding of the ways to governance HFs. Meanwhile, the 
point that the appointed board members prefer this soft approach which doesn’t emphasize the 
direct control of the sector shows they have more consciousness of autonomy and power.  
 
On the Question 8 "Passive or active corporate governance from the Ministry", the difference 
of opinions between the appointed board members and the employee representatives are 
statistically significant (p = 0.068). The appointed board members believe the superior 
authority is more active and less responsibility left to the HFs than the employee 
representatives believe it is. The result shows that the appointed board members have more 
consciousness of responsibility of corporate governance, and they want the enterprises to take 
on more responsibilities. Nevertheless, the employee representatives believe the corporate 
governance from the superior authority is too passive, and they tend to the authorities should 
take on more responsibilities of corporate governance.  
 
The above two results are consistent with the description of the Hypothesis 3.  
 
On the Question 9 "Competence of corporate governance from the superior authority", the 
difference of opinions between the appointed board members and the employee 
representatives are statistically significant (p = 0.018). The appointed board members believe 
the corporate governance is more competent and contribute more to improve the achievement 
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of goals in the activities than the employee representatives believe it is. The two groups of 
respondents described the same situation, but they produced different opinions. The result 
probably indicates that the appointed board members tend to favor the superior authority. 
Their motivation of pleasing the superiors who are their voters corresponds with the 
theoretical motivations of politicians, such as the motivation of re-election. The result also 
shows that the appointed board members have a higher level of tolerance, whereas the 
employee representatives are more rigorous and critical. 
 
On the Question 10.1 "If a conflict between public interests and business interests", there are 
no significantly different opinions between the two groups (p = 0.136). However, although 
there are no significant differences, the mean value (2.44) of the employee representatives’ 
answers is less than the mean value (2.72) of the appointed board members’ answers. The 
result shows that there may be a trend that the employee representatives prefer to represent 
social and public interests. According to the statistical result of the Question 10.2 "If a conflict 
between sector interests and public interests", the employee representatives were also more 
inclined to represent the public interests. The similar results of the two questions indicate that 
the employee representatives often play the roles as common people who consider issues 
more on the perspective of the tangible benefits of the public, rather than on the perspective of 
political and personal utilitarian. Alternatively, as medical workers, the employee 
representatives probably have a preference for public benefits. These results were unexpected 
when I made my hypotheses. 
 
On the Question 10.2 "If a conflict between sector interests and public interests", the 
difference of opinions between the appointed board members and the employee 
representatives are statistically significant (p <0.01). Compared to the employee 
representatives, the appointed board members will more choose to represent the sector 
interests. The statistical result corresponds with the theoretical motivations of politicians. In 
the view of the reputation model, the appointed board members need to choose the sector 
interests which are related to their task performance. In the view of the re-election model, the 
appointed board members need to choose the sector interests as the first option, in order to 
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please the authorities who appoint them. In the view of the ideology model, as politicians, the 
appointed board members will always tend to represent the interests of specific social groups 
rather than the whole society, hence the own sector’s interests become their first choice. The 
result also shows the employee representatives prefer to represent the public interests, and I 
have already interpreted this point in the previous paragraph. Overall, this statistical result is 
generally consistent with the description of Hypothesis 2.  
 
On the Question 10.3 "If a conflict between business interests and sector interests", the 
difference of opinions between the appointed board members and the employee 
representatives are statistically significant (p <0.01). Compared to the appointed board 
members, the employee representatives will more choose to represent the business interests. 
Business interests directly relate to the well-beings and benefits of the enterprises and the 
employees. As employees, logically, it is reasonable that the employee representatives prefer 
business interests. Meanwhile because the employee representatives are elected by the 
employees, they have the motivation to represent business interests, in order to please the 
voters. This result is also consistent with the description of Hypothesis 2.  
 
On the issue of "Liabilities of the boards for the HF goals" (from Question 11.1 to Question 
11.5), there are three statistically significant differences of opinions between the two groups. 
The appointed board member more agree to "If lack of achievements, the Board will be 
criticized by public for not having done its job" (p = 0.047) and "If lack of achievements, the 
Board will be thrown" (p = 0.058), whereas the employee representatives more agree to" If 
lack of achievements, the Board will, in reality, never be held responsible" (p = 0.019). These 
results suggest the cognitive differences on liability between the two groups of respondents. 
The appointed board members believe the HF boards hold a great liability of achievements, 
whereas the employee representatives believe the liability of HF boards is actually limited. 
The results, firstly, indicate that the appointed board members have more consciousness of 
liability, and they pay more attention to the achievements of HF goals. The results, secondly, 
suggest that the appointed board members consider the issue of liability on the perspective of 




On the other two questions of the issue "Liabilities of the boards for the HF goals", there are 
no significantly different opinions between the two groups. 
 
(2) Summary 
According to the above analyses, I can keep the Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. Namely, in 
Norwegian health trusts, on the issues of corporate governance, the appointed board members 
have more consciousness of responsibility, power and autonomy than employee 
representatives. If conflicting interests exist, the appointed board members will be more likely 
to represent the interests of the health sector (sector interests), whereas employee 
representatives will be more likely to represent the interests of the enterprises their own 
(business interests). 
 
In addition to the two hypotheses, the appointed board members and employee representatives 
have different understandings of liability. The appointed board members consider the issue of 
liability on the perspective of principles, whereas the employee representatives tend to 
consider it on the perspective of reality. Furthermore, compared with the appointed board 
members, the employee representatives have a trend to represent the social and public 
interests. Therefore, I cannot conclude that the employee representatives will absolutely prefer 




5.2 Comparison between board members with professional 
backgrounds in public sectors and in private sectors 
 
5.2.1 Differences of opinions on sector political goals 
 
(1) The statistical results of this group comparison are shown as Table 5. 
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Table 5. Statistical results of the group comparison between board members with professional 
backgrounds in public sectors and in private sectors on the issues of sector political goals 
 
 Private group Public group 





vs. business        
goals 
34 4  3.35 
(1.203) 






34 2 2.21 
(0.770) 







35 2 2.20 
(0.677) 







35 2 2.11 
(1.105) 




4.2 Self  
political 
satisfaction 
34 3 2.68 
(0.945) 







35 2 1.94 
(0.968) 







34 2 2.56 
(0.860) 






32 1 1.53 
(0.621) 








32 2 2.31 
(0.780) 




6.3 Letter of 
Commitment 
31 2 1.71 
(0.643) 







27 2 2.22 
(0.892) 







28 2.5 2.50 
(0.923) 




6.6 Meetings 32 2 2.00 
(0.842) 






31 2 2.39 
(0.803) 





6.8 Media 32 3 2.88 
(0.833) 






32 2 2.09 
(0.893) 


















31 2 1.90 
(0.831) 






32 1 1.53 
(0.671) 





Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed). *<0.1 level, **<0.05 level, ***<0.01 level 
 
On the issues of sector political goals, from Question 1 to Question 4, there are no significant 
differences between the two groups. These results indicate that on the issues of HF goals, the 
Public and the Private don’t have significant cognitive differences. The two different 
professional backgrounds do not lead to significant different understandings on the issues of 
HF goals. Therefore, I have to reject the Hypothesis 6, since there is no apparent evidence to 
prove that the Public pay more attention to sector political goals, whereas the Private pay 
more attention to business goals. 
 
On the issue of “Importance of various instruments to achieve sector political goals”, there 
are two statistically significant differences of opinions between the two groups. The board 
members with public sector backgrounds (or the Public) believe "earmarking" of state 
spending on specific assignments (p=0.029) is more important to achieve sector political goals 
than the board members with private sector backgrounds believe it is, whereas the board 
members with private sector backgrounds (or the Private) believe competition for government 
contracts (p=0.009) is more important than the board members with public sector background 
believe it is.  
 
The point that the Public prefer the "earmarking" of state spending on specific assignments, 
indicates compared with the Private, the Public are more familiar with and admit the role of 
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the state funding. Operations of public sectors mainly rely on the state or government finances, 
whereas funding of private sectors is mainly from the market. The statistical result indicates 
that in Norwegian health trusts, the Public prefer and pay more attention to the instrument of 
state funding, whereas the Private have a limited understanding of this instrument, because of 
their lack of relevant experiences.  
 
Meanwhile, there is a trend that the Private prefer the instrument of competition for 
government contracts. This result follows the same logic of the previous result. Private 
sectors usually profit through market competitions, and private sectors can also participate in 
competitions for government contracts. The Private are familiar with this market-based 
instrument. In the view of the logic that private sectors pursue efficiency, competition for 
government contracts is a high efficient instrument to achieve sector political goals.  
 
The two statistical results are consistent with the description of the Hypothesis 7. Namely, in 
Norwegian health trusts, the board members with professional backgrounds in private sectors 
prefer economic and market-based instruments, whereas the board members with professional 
backgrounds in public sectors prefer administrative instruments. 
 
However, on ten of the twelve questions about instruments to achieve sector political goals, 
there are no significant different opinions between the two groups, except the two instruments 
of "earmarking" of state spending on specific assignments and competition for government 
contracts. Despite most of the ten instruments belonged to traditional administrative 
instruments, the Public do not have a preference for these instruments. Consequently, I have 
to reject the Hypothesis 7. 
 
(2) Summary  
The statistic results do not provide sufficient evidence to support that the Public prefer the 
other administrative instruments. Therefore, I will reject the Hypothesis 7. However, 
according to the above analyses, we can accept the results that the board members with public 
sector backgrounds prefer "earmarking" of state spending on specific assignments, whereas 
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the board members with private sector backgrounds prefer competition for government 
contracts.  
 
The two groups of respondents do not have significant differences of opinions on the issues of 
sector political goals and business goals; hence I will reject the Hypothesis 6. 
 
 
5.2.2 Differences of opinions on corporate governance 
 
(1) The statistical results of this group comparison are shown as Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Statistical results of the group comparison between board members with professional 
backgrounds in public sectors and in private sectors on the issues of corporate governance 
 
 Private group Public group 







32 4 3.53 
(1.502) 







33 1 1.67 
(0.816) 






34 1.5 1.82 
(1.029) 




7.4 Present to 
the sector 
30 1 1.87 
(1.167) 






33 3 3.09 
(1.400) 






31 2 3.00 
(1.414) 




7.7 Invisible 31 4 3.97 
(1.169) 




8 Passive or 
active 
32 2 2.25 
(0.622) 






33 2 1.85 
(0.508) 






31 3 3.03 
(1.378) 




10.2 Sector  31 3 2.74 116 3 3.14 0.124 
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vs. Public (1.210) (1.250) (1482.000) 
10.3 Business 
vs. Sector 
35 2 2.23 
(0.942) 







34 2 2.06 
(1.127) 






35 2 2.31 
(0.963) 




11.3  Be 
thrown 
34 2.5 2.94 
(1.127) 







30 5 4.63 
(0.765) 




11.5 Never be 
held 
responsible 
34 4 3.65 
(1.433) 





Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed). *<0.1 level, **<0.05 level, ***<0.01 level 
 
On the issues of corporate governance, including the Question7, Question 8, Question10.2, 
Question10.3 and Question11, there are no significantly different opinions between the two 
groups. The results indicate that the different professional backgrounds hardly impact the 
respondents’ opinions on most of the issues of corporate governance. 
 
On the Question 9 “Competence of corporate governance from the Ministry”, the difference 
of opinions between the board members with public sector backgrounds and with private 
sector backgrounds are statistically significant (p=0.004). The board members with private 
sector backgrounds believe the corporate governance is more competent and contribute more 
to improve the achievements of goals in the activities than the board members with public 
sector backgrounds believe it is. The result probably indicates that the Private are not familiar 
with the corporate governance of HFs which belong to the public sectors, and they believe the 
corporate governance of the Ministry is a complement to their insufficient. Since the values, 
concepts and core goals of private sectors are totally different from those of public sectors, the 
corporate governances of these two types of sectors are also different. Therefore, in the view 
of the Private, they argue that the corporate governance of the authorities may be more 
competent, helpful and useful to achieve the HF goals. 
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On the Question 10.1 “If conflict between society’s (public) interests and business interests”, 
the difference of opinions between the board members with public sector backgrounds and 
with private sector backgrounds are statistically significant (p=0.037). The board members 
with public sector backgrounds choose to represent the public interests, where as the board 
members with private sector backgrounds will be more likely to choose to represent the 
business interests. The result is entirely consistent with the descriptions of Hypothesis 5. 
Namely, in Norwegian health trusts, if a conflict of interests exists, compared with each other, 
the board members with professional backgrounds in public sectors will be more likely to 
represent the public interests, whereas the board members with professional backgrounds in 
private sectors will be more likely to represent the interests of business interests. This result 
indicates that the HF board members’ previous working experiences in public or private 
sectors can strongly influence their value orientations. 
 
(2) Summary 
On most of the issues of corporate governance, there are no significant differences of opinions 
between the two groups of respondents. However, the board members with private sector 
backgrounds believe the corporate governance from the superior authorities is more 
competent and contribute more to improve the achievement of goals in the activities than the 
board members with public sector backgrounds believe it is. 
 
I will keep the Hypothesis 5. Namely, if a conflict of interests exists, compared with each 
other, the board members with professional backgrounds in public sectors will more choose to 
represent the public interests, whereas the board members with professional backgrounds in 
private sectors will be more likely to represent business interests. This result is very useful as 
a reference for the superior authorities when considering board compositions of Norwegian 





6 CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS 
 
6.1 Concluded remarks  
 
The target population of the thesis is the board members of Norwegian Health trusts. The 
study has explored their opinions on the issues of health sector political goals and corporate 
governance. The main focus of the study was to detect the differences of opinions between the 
group of appointed board members and the group of elected employee representatives, as well 
as the differences between the group of board members with public sector backgrounds and 
the group of board members with private sector backgrounds.  
 
The study has shown several tendencies of HF board members’ mean attitudes, but not neutral 
attitudes, on many statements of the questionnaire. These tendencies of opinions are valuable 
for the Norwegian health sectors or academic researchers to understand HF board members’ 
minds on sector political goals and corporate governance. Some interesting findings are: the 
sample HF board members believed that, 1) Sector political goals are more important than 
business goals; 2) They feel more satisfied with the achievements of business goals than of 
sector political goals, and they also believe the sector has the same opinion; 3) If conflicting 
interests exist between public and business interests, they will mainly choose to represent 
public interests; 4) If conflicting interests exist between the sector interests and business 
interests, they will mainly choose to represent the business interests. 
 
Above findings present some important attitudes of HF board members as a whole, on related 
issues. However, there are many differences of opinions among different groups of HF board 
members. 
  
In Norwegian health trusts, several differences of opinions on the issues of sector political 
goals and corporate governance exist between the group of appointed board members and the 
group of elected employee representatives. These results are consistent with some research 
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hypotheses I made based on relevant motivation theories. Although the two groups of HF 
board members have similar needs such as job securities, personal growth and achievements, 
the different ways of elections, the different logic between politicians and medical workers, 
and some other factors can still lead to the differences of opinions between the two groups.   
 
Theoretically, appointed board members should pay more attention to political goals and the 
sector interests which their voters, the sector, care more about; whereas the employee 
representatives pay more attentions to business goals and business interests which their voters, 
the enterprises and employees, care more about. These are due to the considerations of their 
motivations of re-election, reputation and ideology (Ludvigsen, 2010). However, the study 
has not shown an apparent evidence to prove that the employee representatives pay more 
attention to business goals; but they really do not have so in-depth understanding and do not 
pay so close attention to the sector political goals, compared to the appointed board members. 
The finding can be interpreted like that the employee representatives probably have fewer 
concerns about their re-elections and reputations, so that they do not pay more attention to 
business goals for pleasing their voters. Although the employee representatives also need to 
consider their job securities, personal growth or achievements as HF board members, they 
may have some other motivations rather than these, since their roles of HF boards are not as 
formal and steady as appointed board members. Whereas the appointed board members, as 
politicians, do have stronger motivations of re-election, reputation and ideology, so that they 
pay more attention to sector political goals. 
 
Another difference of opinions between the two groups of HF board members is that the 
employee representatives prefer some micro，specific and technical instruments to achieve 
their goals, compared with the appointed board members. Combining with some motivation 
theories of medical professionals, I may infer that the employee representatives, who are 
usually medical workers, are used to consider the issues of sector political goals on a more 
micro and specific perspective. I can also conclude that the appointed board members have a 
more macro and broad perspective. This is in accordance with people’s common impression 
of politicians.     
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The study has also shown that in Norwegian health trusts, on the issues of corporate 
governance, the appointed board members have more consciousness of responsibility, power 
and autonomy than employee representatives do. If conflicting interests exist, the appointed 
board members will be more likely to represent the sector interests, whereas the employee 
representatives will be more likely to represent business interests. These two findings are in 
line with the hypotheses I made. An unexpected finding is that the employee representatives 
are also inclined to represent the public interests. This result indicates that the employee 
representatives are used to play the roles as common people or medical workers who consider 
related issues more on the perspective of social benefits, and it also proves that their roles and 
status of HF boards are not as formal as appointed board members. The main findings about 
differences of opinions between the above two groups are concluded in Table 7. 
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The previous work experiences in public or private sectors can also influence the attitudes and 
judgments of HF board members. The differences of opinions on related issues exist between 
the group of board members with public sector backgrounds and the group with private sector 
backgrounds, because on one hand, the core goals and values between public sectors and 
private sectors are fundamentally different, which lead to different logic and value 
orientations between their employees; on the other hand, people’s primary occupational or 
academic experiences may influence their current opinions on some issues.   
 
The first finding of this group comparison is that, although at present the respondents play the 
same roles as HF board members, the ones with public sector backgrounds have a tendency of 
caring about public interests and responsibilities, whereas the ones with private sector 
backgrounds more care about business interests and efficiency. This result is totally consistent 
with my research hypothesis. According to this result, I recommend that the people with 
public sector backgrounds are more suitable to be selected as HF board candidates, since the 
Norwegian health trusts should firstly pursue health political goals and public interests rather 
than the private benefits. The core objectives and values of HFs are more similar to those of 
public sectors, so that the principles, institutions and instruments of corporate governance of 
HFs should be more closed to those of public sectors. People with public sector backgrounds 
are more likely to become HF board members, since they have more concerns about public 
interests and more social responsibilities, as well as more familiar with the corporate 
governance of public sectors. This viewpoint is also consistent with one foregoing statistical 
result that, in my research samples, the HF board members with public sector backgrounds 
account for 78.4% of all. 
 
The other finding is that the board members with public sector backgrounds have a preference 
for the instrument of "earmarking" of state spending on specific assignments to achieve sector 
political goals, whereas the board members with private sector backgrounds prefer 
competition for government contracts. The differences of opinions on these two instruments 
can be interpreted as the influence of the HF board members’ previous professional 
experiences, for instance, the board members with private sector backgrounds have a more 
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in-depth understanding of the benefits of competition for contracts, which is a typical 
market-based instrument. The main findings about the differences of opinions between the 
two groups are shown in Table 8.   
 
Table 8. Different logic of board members with public sector backgrounds vs. with private sector 
backgrounds in HFs 
 
 
6.2 Research limitations and future improvements 
 
Although I attempted to construct my thesis based on scientific research methods, systematic 
literature review, random and relevant data, as well as normative interpretation, there are still 
some research limitations I can’t avoid, especially the data.   
  
First of all, most of the questions of the questionnaire I used are to detect respondents’ 
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results and conclusions of my thesis will highly relate to the quality of the respondents’ 
answers. Another limitation is that the questions of the questionnaire are a little general but 
not specific to HF board members. A better questionnaire for future research could be more 
based on health issues and daily activities of the HF board members. 
 
Secondly, I can’t avoid the limitation of cross-sectional data. Compared with longitudinal data, 
the data from the questionnaire I used, as cross-sectional data, cannot provide me sufficient 
information of the differences of the respondents’ opinions over a period of time. In addition, 
as cross sectional data eliminates the past and future comparisons, the causes and effects of 
the subjects in the study are unknown, hence failing to answer the precise question (Bhalerao, 
2011). A better data type for future research could be panel data or time-series data. This type 
of data can let me observe the variation of HF board members’ opinions over time, as well as 
to interpret the causalities more effectively. 
 
Thirdly, some limitations of secondary analysis exit. As Bryman (2008, p.300) described in 
his famous book Social Research Methods, some limitations of secondary analysis need to 
warrant some attention, such as Lack of familiarity with data, Complexity of the data, No 
control over data quality and Absence of key variables. 
 
Another limitation is about the power of non-parametric test. For the data with normal 
distribution, T-test is more efficient than non-parametric test (Ma, 2008, p.79). However, the 
non-parametric test is still the most suitable method for my thesis, because of the small 
sample size of the data without normal distribution. A larger size of data which can be 
analyzed by T-tests or even regressions may be more beneficial for the future improvements. 
However, it seems impossible to collect so big size of data if only focus to Norwegian HFs.   
 
The last limitation I found is that I am not native Norwegian. Including the questionnaire I 
used, many literatures related to management of the health trusts are written in Norwegian. 
However, it is not a big problem to affect the quality of the thesis, since it just led me spend a 
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APPENDICES: THE QUESTIONNARIE (TANSLATED) 
@1 gender of the responder 
@2 age of the responder 
@3 living city of the responder 
@4 position in the board 
• chairman 
• appointed by the sector 
• elected by the staff 
@5 chief or deputy member in the board 
@6 years in the board 
@7 professional backgrounds  
• Private business,  
• Organization or trust,  
• Municipal or county agencies,  
• Government activities,  
• Other public sector  
• Other 
@8 any experience as a representative 
• Board experience in the private sector 
• Board experience in other governmental activities 
• Board experience in the trade union, political party or other types of organizations 
• Experience as Member of Parliament  
• Experience as a Minister or Secretary of State 
• Experience in municipal or county 
• Other 
@9 how important do you think business goals are compared with sector political goals? 
@10 how often does the Board make tradeoffs between conflicting sector political goals? 
@11 to what extent would you say that the achievement of sector political tasks to be 
measured and quantified? 
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@12 how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the achievements of sector political goals and 
business goals? 
@13 in your mind how satisfied or dissatisfied is the superior authority with the achievements 
of sector political goals and business goals? 
@14 Governments can use various instruments to reach the so-called sector political goals. 
How important do you think each of the following instruments is when it comes to 
achieve sector political goals? 
• Requirements of legislation, regulations, and any licensing requirements 
• "earmarking" of state spending on specific assignments 
• Priorities of the Ministry's Letter of Commitment 
• Regulation of prices or fees for business products  
• Competition for government contracts.  
• Corporate governance of the Ministry through meetings, etc 
• Control through direct contacts and outside the formal practice channels  
• Control signals through the media  
• The Ministry's approval of important decisions 
• Orders from state supervision and control organs  
• Notes / instructions from the Office of the Auditor  
• Board composition and expertise 
@15 agree or disagree to the following statements about the corporate governance of the 
sector 
• Ministry’s governance is limited to General Assembly   
• The Ministry's management in addition to Annual General Meeting takes place through 
Grant /implements settings / Letter of Commitment.   
• Ministry’s governance through formal meetings with the Chairman /Board.  
• Major issues are presented to the Ministry before decision  
• Ministry’s rules through informal contact with Chairman / Board  
• The Ministry manages the direct contact with President  
• The Ministry's control is invisible because management adapt to changing political        
signals) 
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@16 which of these descriptions of the Ministry’s corporate governance do you think is best? 
• Owner Ministry is too passive (too much responsibility is left to the enterprise)  
• Owner Ministry is neither passive nor active   
• Owner Ministry is active (too little responsibility left to the enterprise)  
@17 which of these descriptions of the Ministry's competence and the exercise of corporate 
governance seems to fit best?   
• Corporate governance is competent and contribute greatly to improving the achievement 
of objectives in the activities  
• Corporate governance is competent and contribute something to improve the 
achievement of objectives in the activities  
• Corporate governance is not very competent and contributing nothing to diminish the 
achievement of objectives in the activities  
• Corporate governance is not very competent and contributing greatly to undermine the 
achievement of objectives in the activities  
@18 Where to agree or disagree to the following statements about role conflicts as a director? 
• If there is a conflict between public interests and business interests, I choose to represent 
public interests  
• If there is a conflict between the sector interests and public interests, I choose to 
represent the sector interests 
• If there is a conflict between business interests and sector interests, I choose to represent 
the business interests 
@19 there may be various opinions about what it means that the board is responsible for the 
organization's objectives. Where agree or disagree to the following statements about how 
such liability is asserted to the Board?  
• If lack of achievements, the Board will be criticized public for not having done its job  
• If lack of achievements, the Board will not be re-appointed .  
• If lack of achievements, the Board will be thrown 
• If lack of achievements, the Board will be addressed litigation against the directors  
• If lack of achievements, the Board will in reality never be held responsible 
 
